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The purpose in this article is to investigate the relationship between 
probability and logics in order to understand the notion of expectation in 
Keynes, and to examine the contributions that a set of postkeynesian 
authors has made to clarify the sense and the meaning of the notion of 
expectation in the framework of both the theoretical and the economic 
policy. We will start by integrating Keynes`s work on the theory of the 
probabilities into the construction of his theoretical corpus. We will 
emphasise the role of the expectation as the main contribution of Keynes to 
the economic thought in the theoretical framework of uncertainty.  The 
article is divided in two parts. Firstly,it will examines the contribution of 
Keynes to the interpretation of the meaning of the expectations in a 
theoretical framework of Uncertainty. Secondly, it will examine the 
comments of Shackle and Kregel on the role of expectations in the theory 
and the economic policy and will consider the appreciations of Minsky on 
the volatility of the expectations in a framework of finantial instability. 
 
JEL: B5, O3, O4. Keywords: history of the economic ideas in Latin America, 
economic theory, expectations, theory of expectations 
 
 
1.Uncertainty and the notion of probability 
 
 The notion of probability and the macroeconomics that appears with the 
General Theory, a theory on the output and the employment, is a 
methodological movement that allows for a critical revaluation of the 
meaning of the classic theory of the prices as the only and exclusive 
mechanism of adjustment of the system.  By separating macroeconomics 
from microeconomics, it is possible to approach the problems of the 
economic system in a different form and to explicitly to suggest 
interpretations distant from the ones of the neoclassical theory. 
In an attempt to determine the volume of output and employment, Keynes 
so himself forced, as a consequence of his philosophical ideas, to 
incorporate in his methodological framework, the two forms of the 
organizational construction that lead to form of logical thought, having 
substantially privileged the unexplored way of macroeconomics. Keynes 
draws  a new line in the General Theory, a line between a theory of the 
stationary equilibrium and a theory of the mobile equilibrium, where in the 
analysis of the partial equilibrium of the firm the concerns about the 
characteristics of the money are dispensable, since the firms operate with 
amounts of fixed resources and constant conditions. But when the 
employment is analysed as a whole, a monetary theory of the production   2
and the employment as a whole is also necessary, because the capitalism 
is a system where there are changes in the opinion about the future that 
influence the present Keynes [ 1971:88 ].    
Keynes was in favour of an integrative vision of the economic methods, 
depending on the task that is faced, although he was conscious about the 
problems that both methods place to the investigator.Therefore, it 
constitutes not surprise that the search for an excellent combination of 
these methods is a singularly difficult art.  To Klunt [1975:103], the balance 
between both methods, which is concern of Keynes, has been surpassed 
by the Instrumentalism or the modern methodologies of Kuhn and Lakatos 
which avoid a detailed consideration on this dilemma. These 
methodological problems are approach in the Treatise on Probability. 
The terms probability or certainty describe the varios degrees of the rational 
belief of a proposition that different quantities of knowledge consent us to 
conjecture about. The objective probability theory allows for the 
philosophical study of these types of knowledge. The degree of rational 
belief that we can guarantee for this kind of conclusions, i.e. its probability, 
does not have anything to do with the actual events. 
It is admitted that the knowledge on which behaviour, science or 
metaphysics, are basis, on which we form most of our arguments, our 
rational beliefs, is inconclusive, at least, the higher degree. 
Keynes establishes which rational beliefs can be derived from a set of facts 
that are acquired directly. All the propositions are false or true. The 
knowledge that we have of them depends on our circumstances, and as it is 
frequently convenient to speak of propositions as certain or probable, this 
strictly expresses the position in which they are in ralation to the body of the 
actual or hypothetical knowledge. 
The theory of the probability is logical because its respects the degree of 
belief with which is rational to speculate in determined circumstances, and 
not because the beliefs are of particular individuals. The probability in this 
sense a question of human caprice, it is above all a question human logics.  
Probability tells us that rational beliefs you add, certain or probable, can be 
derived as valid arguments from our direct knowledge, given a body of 
direct knowledge that constitute our last premises.  This involves pure 
logical relations between the propositions that incorporate our direct 
knowledge and the propositions on which we seek for indirect knowledge.  
The particular propositions that we select as the premises of our arguments 
depend on particular subjective factors, peculiar to ourselves, but the 
relationships to which other propositions are related and that we entitled as 
probable relations, are objective and logical. 
This theory of the probabilities is a methodological way of which Keynes 
makes systematic use in his theoretical work and that acquires in the 
General Theory a relevance that is convinient to have present. 
Keynes`s concept of the probability is larger than the one used in the 
statistical frequency concept of a fact. His conception of the probabilities is 
nearer to the Logics than to the Mathematics [Vicarelli, 1985:174].  Thus 
[Braithwaite, 1975:  240] the attempt to use the concept of equilibrium in the 
amplest sense, with deep roots in the tradition of the general equilibrium, 
and therefore in an exclusively deductive methodological framework, allows 
to bring Keynes closer to Walras, giving place to the interpretations à la   3
Hicks or à la Patinkin-Clower-Leijonhuvfud, where unemployment is 
explained by the situation of rigidity in the system of prices and wages, or 
which are quantitative and institutional restrictions. 
But the application of the concept of probability to the General Theory is 
related with the logical process of the determination of the under 
employment equilibrium. The content questions are related to the place of 
the expectations and to the way they represent the vision of Keynes on the 
capitalism from a theoretical point of view.  The absence of the 
consideration of this relation leads to the use of the neoclassical concept of 
equilibrium in the various interpretations of the General Theory, authorizing, 
in this sense, for example, IS-LM propositions[Vicarelli: 198]. 
 
The General Theory shows the incompatibility between the Walrasian 
equilibrium, and therefore the full employment of the factors, and the 
Keynesian under employment vision of the equilibrium.  In the relation with 
the plan underlying the General Theory the comparisons between the ex-
ante and ex-post values, which are possible to avoid within the approach to 
the equilibrium are basis on completely different levels of analysis. This is 
affirmed by Keynes, in a theoretical clarification published one year after the 
publication of the general Theory, thus leaving little room for doubts about 
the use of the probabilistic approach.  
The analytical ability of the General Theory lies in the fact that it explains, at 
a highest level of abstraction, the forces that determine the levels of the 
income and employment in a particular poin in time, emphasizing the 
coexistence at each time point, of the decisions basis on the expectations of 
short and long term period. 
The validity of the Keynesian theory on the effective demand in different 
situations of equilibrium is the moust convincing argument advocating that 
the neoclassical equilibrium doesn’t matter, and that the Keynesian theory 
is constructed outside the analytical framework of the general equilibrium. 
This implies the understanding of the theory without an orthodox look at the 
Marshalliang language of its exposition, and therefore the consideration that 
what is attempted is to capture the forces that determine the output and the 
employment. 
To Keynes, the economic theory is a method more than a doctrine, an 
apparatus of the mind, a thinking technique that helps to extract corrects 
conclusions.  The theory uses value judgments and introspection; it has to 
do with reasons, expectations and psychological uncertainties. Therefore, it 
cannot be converted into a model, whose a quantitative formula destroys its 
utility as an instrument of thought [1936, 292-294]. 
The term equilibrium, loaned from the physics and indicating some position 
of rest, refers to a method of analysis basis on the intertemporal action of 
economic forces.  The use of the term equilibrium is only a problem of 
method and language and, in this sense, the mobile equilibrium notion used 
by Keynes is a non-equilibrium in the Marshallian meaning.  It is clear that it 
is this use by Keynes of the equilibrium notion that generates one of the 
most common confusions among the economists who interpret his thought. 
The probabilistic approach of the expectations, in the sense of the Treatise, 
gains greater importance through the way Keynes discusses the uncertainty 
in the General Theory. This is of extreme importance inasmuch as it allows   4
a different point of view with respect to the role of the expectations in the 
elaboration of the concepts of marginal efficiency of the capital and liquidity 
preference, two key pillars in the theoretical construction of Keynes. 
For example, this approach finds application in chapter 12 of the General 
Theory, dedicated to the long term expectations, where Keynes affirms that 
the state of long-term expectations not only depends on the most probable 
forecasts but also on the confidence associated to them. The economic 
decisions are not taken in a risk context, as in the case the test that are 
repeated and whose probabilities are calculated on a frequency basis, but 
in a context of uncertainty, characterized by information scarcity. 
More precisely, an interpretation of the expectations in the light of the 
Keynesian concept of the probabilities, makes it possible to see, for 
example, the formation of the long term expectations and the use of this 
concept in the calculation of the marginal efficiency of the capital.  Keynes 
assumes that the entrepreneurs start with the observation of a series of 
information that the market provides in a regular way.  Starting from these, 
a series of elements is derived, which can be in the prospective evaluation 
of the return of the investments. From this prospective evaluation, basis in a 
certain degree of knowledge, expectations result that can stimulate or 
hinder investment and, in this way, a probability is determined. 
Sincet the entrepreneurs decide the levels of production on the basis of 
their demands and the expectations on prices, the forces of the demand 
added to the propensity to the consumption and the marginal efficiency of 
the capital influence the production level. And this proposal of Keynes is 
independent of the equilibrium.  If in a determined point in time the whole 
market is in excess relatively to the production.This will be a moment for the 
revision of the expectations and of the production plans. If we pay attention 
to the fundamental propositions contained in chapter 3, in the light of his 
notion of probability, where Keynes summarizes the propositions later 
developed in his work, namely that the involuntary unemployment is caused 
by the insufficiency of effective demand, the involuntary unemployment 
corresponds to the observed reality, of which we have direct knowledge. 
The aggregate demand is a proposition known through the argument. The 
explanation of the economic forces is part of the logical relation between 
observationand conclusion. In other words, an increment in the investment 
leads to an increment in the income. Here the `increment in investment` 
constitutes the evidence on which we basis our argument, while an 
increment in the income is an induced conclusion with a probability 
determined by the degree of rational belief that can be attributed to this 
conclusion.  Notice this is valid within the set of propositions, among which 
that Y = F (N) where N is N = F (D), considering the state of the technology 
as known, the consumer’s preferences as given, etc., the reason why 
another function N = x (D) being x a decreasing function (the Ricardian case 
of the introduction of the machines that diminish the employment and the 
income) can lead to another conclusion and therefore logically to one 
another degree of rational belief.  This probability, however, does not have 
anything to do with the given effective result in terms of income level. 
The interpretation of the General Theory as an analysis of forces, which is a 
specific point of time determines the income and the employment, make it 
possible to clarify an important moment of content of the logical model of   5
Keynes, namely, the meaning and consequences of the coexistence of 
`short-and-long-period expectations`.  The entrepreneur´s decisions on the 
short term production depend on the short term expectations on the return 
of sells. The decisions pertaining to the increase of the production depend 
on the long term expectations with relation to the return of the investment.  
The capitalist system is characterized by the fact that both decisions 
simultaneously take place in a point in time, influencing both the forces in 
action.  We can here discard the error that the method of Keynes has in 
consideration the phenomena in a time horizon and not as Marshall where 
the phenomena happen in times of different nature and length. 
This approach places the analysis in a very high degree and level of 
generalization and abstraction, in which it is possible to take into 
consideration the meaning of an ample set of phenomena. Therefore, we 
can speak of an analysis carried out in time, not in the sense of that the 
analysis aims to determine what happens over time seales, but in the sense 
that no phenomenon of relevant action is ignored in one determined time 
moment. In the neoclassical synthesis, the models are determined, but it 
must be said that the determination of the models not necessarily sacrifices 
these aspect of the capitalist reality where Keynes basiss his interpretation 
of the forces in action in a determined point of time. 
As Keynes demonstrates this consists in the coexistence of three different 
processes of decision making.  Two of these are short term decisions: 
decisions of the entrepreneurs who plan the combination of the factors in 
the short term horizonf, the decisions of the owners of wealth concerning 
the assets to be held.  The third, one is a long term decision:  the decision 
of the entrepreneurs to create demand for the new capital goods, in the 
basis of their short terms expectations.  The decisions can be corrects or 
wrong. 
The General Theory doesn’t say how to make corrects decisions, since of 
the interaction of millions of agents leads obviously to contradictory 
decisions, but it tells us that if they are wrong, the error will influence the 
formation of the expectations in some future point of the time.  If they are 
corrects does not mean that they will be repeated, i.e., that the rate of 
investment, or the normal rate of accumulation, or the use of the capacities 
will tend to be fulfilled according to the long term expectations. 
To argue that in the course of time the interest rate and the investment tend 
to certain normal values due to the fact that the forces that hinder this trend 
tend to be neutralized over time, implies the definition of postulates from 
which we deduce which forces are temporary and which are permanents. 
In the case of the theories of the equilibrium, they start from  the 
consideration that there are rational individuals that behaving in a 
determined way, give place to a series of chained acts, from which an 
optimum results.  This presume the existence of a coordination device, the 
invisible hand of Smith, the comisseur-priseur of Walras, the auctioneer of 
Edgeworth, the Böhm-Bawerk´s horse-trader, in the most consistent 
theories.  I believe that the theory of Keynes refuse to accept the existence 
of the perfect coordination mechanisms, while the theories that challenge 
the Keynesian thought persevere using premisses that defend laissez-faire 
behaviours of  agents, that in reality are asymmetrically placed in the 
markets.   6
From another point of view, it could be affirmed that the operation of these 
forces can be fitted in a mathematical model, whose determination confirms 
the logical nature of the inductive process.  The solution of this model can 
be called equilibrium, but it is clear that what we call equilibrium it is a virtual 
equilibrium, in which all the magnitudes are given ex-ante and the agents 
expectations are determined exogenously, as in the case of the Walrasian 
tatonêment.  
The strong side of the conception of expectation resides in the way as the 
argument is basis on the greater possible objective information, namely, the 
observed reality.  The subjective factor exists; it resides in the choice of the 
aspects from reality taken as control point. And this does not have anything 
to do with the arbitrary nature of the conclusions, but it constitutes rather the 
key point of the theory. Probability is not human caprice. When above all 
referred to the logics. 
The theory of the probability is logical, because it depend from the degree 
of belief that guide the rational reflection under certain circumstances, and 
not because the beliefs arise from a particular individuals. The particular 
propositions that we select to ourselves as the premises of our arguments 
depend on the particular, peculiar and subjective factors, but the relations, 
in which other propositions lie upon these, and that we label probable 
relations, are objectives and logically.  It is important to stress that the 
probability has an objective character inasmuch as it gives place to the 
degrees of belief of a  propositionl basis in the logic, distinct from the 
probability of subjective-psychological degrees of belief that can be 
quantified by some method, as for example the method of betting of 
Ramsey. 
The human logics can help to understand the mechanism that leads to 
determine the reliability state, i.e., the complex of conditions from which the 
agents derive decisive importance in their decisions making. 
The fact that the relevant and available evidence increases the weight of 
the probability of an argument, may add or decrease it, depending on 
whether the new knowledge reinforces the favourable the evidence. The 
only basis for a higher knowledge in uncertainty situations is a better 
information, an improved degree of confidence relatively to this information. 
In the General Theory, the uncertainty expectations overwhelm means 
information scarcity, which is the worse basis to infer consequence on the 
future.  The uncertainty about the elements that form the expectation 
reduces the confidence. In this sense  the choice of the entrepreneurs is a 
probable decision. 
When Hicks [1936] formalizes the General Theory, he captures the 
strategical importance of the expectations to Keynes but he emphasizes the 
limitations and danger of this approach.  The danger resides in the risk that 
the analytical power of the method of the expectations maydisappear in the 
long-term applications. In its vision, these limitations were implicit in the 
hypothesis of the invariance of the expectations with respect to the occurred 
events, in Hicks´s words, within the period considered in the analysis 
[Kregel, 1982]. 
Undoubtedly, one of the most original characteristics of Keynes´s vision of 
the capitalism is  that the expectations motivate real and financial economic 
decisions.  However, this expectation, designated previously, could be   7
derived with the possible highest degree of probability and exactly even 
though not correspond to the factual reality, which is influenced by a vast 
number of circumstances.  The comparison between the logical conclusions 
and the factual reality is illegitimate and it cannot constitute a decisive 
element in the judgment of the theory. 
The strong side of Keynes´s the conception of probability lies in the way as 
the argument is basis on the greater objective and possible information, 
namely, the observed reality.  The subjective factor exists, it resides in the 
choice aspects of the reality taken as influence point, and it does not have 
anything to do with the arbitrary nature of the conclusions, but it constitutes 
the key point of the complete theory.  It is unquestionable the key 
importance to Keynes of the intensity of effective demand, the existing 
amount of capital goods, the trends in the market of values -contrary to the 
spots of sun or the wether which the entrepreneurs would take as control 
point of the reality when formulating their expectations. 
Keynes regain thus a certain methodological optimism, allowing for 
interpretation of the uncertainty in terms of probability. In this way its theory 
of the expectations lies far beyond of any irrational interpretation of the 
impossibility to know the things and the phenomena. 
 
2. The decisive importance of the expectations 
 
To Shackle [1977] the theory that emerge with Keynes is placed in a 
reinstatement perspective, seeking to answer to a world in dissolution.  In 
this sense, according to Schake [1956], Keynes found scarcity as the 
central idea of the science of his time.   He added as second idea of equal 
importance, the uncertainty as an element that mines the soul of the firms in 
the capitalist economies. 
 Schakles translates Keynes´s vision in a strong version of uncertainty that 
characterizes the decision making of the agents. Even though the 
behaviours may be irrational, because they are taken place in an world of 
ignorance.  The true enigma lies in the characteristics of a monetary 
economy.  It is through the use of the money that our ignorance and 
diffidence on the future of our acts and choices may have place, by simply 
transferring or postponing a decision. Exchange has as purpose the 
satisfaction of necessities, but in a monetary economy an exchange act 
requires the conversion in money with the aim of obtaining another good, 
the end of the production is the profit. 
In this sense, the General Theory presents a theory that emphasizes the 
uncertainty of the human mind win regard to the economic and 
entrepreneural subjects.  According to Shackle, the method of the 
equilibrium permit to demonstrate how the free activity of the involved 
parties, when restrained by their ignorance about the future, make them 
seek protection in a defensive politics that may prevent the risks of the 
business to be specialized in a form of wealth on which the future depends. 
This is either because its value is feared or because there are compelled on 
guess the future, reason why it is rational to desire to possess money, 
rather than develop a machine. 
But what creates employment is the construction of machines, rather than 
the money possession. In this way the preference for the liquidity may lead   8
to a situation where the particular interests transcend the interests of the 
general prosperity and lead to the disequilibria with unemployment. Is the 
transference of the expenditure to the future employment is destroy and the 
unemployment is increased. Since there is no conformity between an act to 
save and an act of investing.  The interest rate does not equilibrate the part 
of the income that is not consumed with the investment. People prefer to 
conserve money: 
The argument, as it is known, is that only if the amount of income was 
constant could be acceptance that the amount saving is determined by the 
interest rate; but he is not correct, if the income is changeable, depending 
on the consumption and the investment. The interest is the price of the 
money. 
Shackle, conscientious about the critique on the undetermination of the 
classic interest rate by Keynes, which was based on the analysis of the 
partial equilibrium, seeks to demonstrate the validity of the theory of the 
preference for the liquidity through a more convincing form.  According to 
this author, Keynes would have distinguished in his analysis quantities of 
flows and stocks. The saving and the investment are flows, i.e., they are 
units of a determined species per time unit (tons, dollar per time unit ). In 
the determination of the interest rate, Keynes take in considerations the 
stock of money and the stock of bonds, i.e., the acceptance of debt. The 
money in the possession of the public, the firms and the banks, composes 
the total of the payment values that can simultaneously be carried through. 
The individuals and the firms will keep a larger stock of money that they will 
use for some reasons.  They will be able to keep money, so as to take 
precautions itself of monetary losses or other forms of wealth.  A form of 
wealth is the title, the ones that constitute a promise to reimburse shares in 
a stipulated plan.  But the genuine the interest rate to be received by the 
lenders depends on the value that these title acquire in the transactions by 
the stockholders.  If the price of the bond becomes low, the interest rate 
rises.  In this case or in the contrary case, the lenders purchase with a bond 
the right to payments differed in the time. When they earn this loan if they 
are not sure that they will not want this money before the date, then  they 
will have to take into account that there is the possibility of having to sell this 
bond in the stock market at a price that they cannot know in advance.  A 
lender needs to have guarantees against eventual losses. As the loss is a 
disutility, the lenders require compensation or reward. 
The oscillations in the prices of the title will provoke speculation.  There will 
be the ones that thinking that the title´s prices will sink, will look to sell them; 
the ones that think that the prices will continue to go up, will look to buy 
them, i.e., there is exist different expectations on the future of the prices of a 
form of wealth, that will provoke changes in the money stock. The interest 
rate depends thus on the expectations. It is through the uncertainty that the 
interest rate has a greater and vaster channel which  act over  the 
investment decisions. 
The investment is a fiction imagined in the demand for the profit. It is not 
therefore the accounting of what was carried through in the past.  The 
investment is a share that was prepared for the future. Nobody can foresee 
what will the market for a product be like five years now. Nobody can 
conjecture about the way the discoveries and the inventions will make a   9
determined product an obsolete product. Nobody can foresee now the costs 
of the resources used to produce it. But for the sake of simplicity and 
consistency, some idea will have to be announced. In the contrary case, the 
maximization would be an exercise full of contradictions.  In the framework 
of the method of the equilibrium, the entrepreneurs will maximize a profit 
results from comparing the expected value of the sold product with the 
operational costs, which implies to use a gamma of resources, considered 
annually during the useful life of the investment, deducted in the present at 
the interest rate of market. That is to say, considering the notion of 
efficiency marginal of the capital, that the investment results precarious, 
autonomous and without known prognostic.  It is assumed that an expected 
value can be calculated.  But this value cannot be considered as given. 
Sells correct the production plans, which implies to produce for existences if 
there is a production excess.  In the recommence of the subsequent plan, 
the entrepreneurs will review the production and the level of employment 
required for the new plan.  Is estimated that sells will continue low, and as a 
result of the level of production and the employment will oscillate to a lower 
level of production and employment. Therefore, reminding the mordacious 
spirit of Keynes, Shackle underline that when the things are not scarce it is 
nonsense to reduce the consumption and to diminish the investment, 
setting off the people and unemployed. Challenging the idea  that the 
existing information is complete, that the knowledge is adequate, the 
problem is that the questions to be studied require a degree of belief for 
which exists lack of knowledge, being this dominant lack of knowledge 
inside the human subjects [1983, 5]. 
Methodologically considering the role that play the information structuring 
and in the basis of the knowledge and of the confidence that influence the 
decisions making in a monetary economy, where the essential motivation of 
the entrepreneurs is the profit, on which the decisions on investment 
depend, and in last instance, the employment also. To Shackle, the theory 
of Keynes is not only criticized by its formal exposition, but also because it 
has threatened the moral principles where the orthodox theory is grounded:  
the parsimony of the agents, the accumulation of wealth and the inequality 
of the distribution. Although the interpretation of Shackle [1977] is 
categorized for certain nihilism on the real possibility of the agents being 
able to make use of the required information, this retakes the thought of 
Keynes in a more authentic course, assuming that those who make 




The expectations and the monetary economy.  
 
 J.A. Kregel [1983], after Shackle, has been developing in a postkeynesian 
perspective, the idea that the most revolutionary element of the General 
Theory is the expectations, which permit to emphasize the difference 
between ex-ante and ex-post decisions in an uncertain world where the 
expectations can be frustrating.  Kregel regard as vital to understand 
Keynes to consider the distinction between an economy of exchanges and 
a monetary economy.  In this last one, the money not only has the function   10
of neutral link between the transactions in real assets and others things 
[1975,408-409]. 
It is in a monetary economy that the effective demand attains importance 
through the existence of uncertainty and diffidence. According to Kregel, the 
correct magnitude is the expected or anticipated value of the predictable, 
i.e. the expected value that result by the use of a volume of employment. 
The variables in their relations must be interpreted in the context and in 
terms of expectations. The method of Keynes, according to Kregel, is 
characterized by placing hypotheses on the expectations. This method 
estimates that the expectations are always presents (against the idea of a 
world with perfect information and full certainty, settle down these 
hypotheses to be followed, as the orthodox theory would have made). 
Conceiving constant expectations, different hypotheses on these 
expectations can be assumed, and observe the effects that their alteration 
provokes on the system. 
Assuming constant expectations, Keynes [1975] does not pressume that 
the world is completely predicable or that full certainty exists. This means 
that, distinguishing the difference between actual and waited results it can 
be demonstrated as the effective demand affects the employment, in a way 
that the system can reach under employment equilibrium. In this way, the 
equilibrium of under employment demonstrated in the General Theory is the 
result of the revision of the expectations, which is coherent with the vision 
that the persistent employment is the result of the absence of reequilibrium 
forces, due to the agents uncertainty on the interest rate and to the fact that 
the politics of flexible wages does not contribute for the reestablishment of 
the equilibrium of full employment in a closed economy either.  The fact is 
that Keynes [1978] has not made a clear statement where and in which 
situations he was assuming changes in expectations [1978,180]. 
To Kregel, Keynes presents in the General Theory a world where the long 
term expectations can be moved independently of the economic results, 
where the short term expectations associates with particular results can be 
frustrated and to affect the long term expectations.  In this model Keynes 
estimates that the expectations are constant and that the frustrate 
expectations of short-term do not affect them. In his 1937 writings he 
suggests one third possibility, estimating that the long term expectations are 
constant and that the short term expectations are always carry on, the 
expectations become inelastic and all the emphasis is given to the effective 
demand.  This allows Kregel to conclude that this third possibility gave 
place to a model of static equilibrium, where the expectations are not 
frustrated nor a movement of the expectations is provoked.  This model is 
the one that Keynes used to demonstrate that the unemployment is not a 
short term phenomenon, i.e. that the unemployment is persistent.   
Therefore it can be said, according to Kregel that Keynes suggests three 
models in accordance with his presumption about the expectations.  First, a 
model of static equilibrium, where the expectations are given and constant, 
which do not answer to the short term expectations, even though that they 
can be frustrating for some individuals.  Second, a model of stationary 
equilibrium, where the long term expectations continue constant.  Third, a 
model where different situations of given long term expectations are 
compared, allowing that the expectations of short term can be frustrated.    11
The entrepreneurs review their plans of production if the expectations are 
frustrating; they change their expectations until the point where the effective 
demand determines the amount of employment, moving their position in the 
supply curve without a move of the curve itself.  To Kregel this is the only 
way that allowed Keynes to emphasize the expectations as a pre-requisite 
of the effective demand theory allowing movements in the function without 
provoking movements of the  function itself. 
When Keynes came to political conclusions, he frequently used a third 
model:  the model of alterable equilibrium that he exposes in chapter 18 of 
the General Theory.  This model is the dynamic model where the current 
frustrations can affect the state of the expectations in general, in a way that 
the functions that integrate the expectations can move freely in the course 
of time.  The movements do not take place only along the curves, but the 
curves of supply and demand are moved, in a way that the whole system 
responds to the frustrations before the expectations. 
The fact is that Keynes uses until the 17 chapter a static model, Kregel 
explains, must be intended to the fact that he seek to demonstrate his 
effective demand theory and to the fact of that the expectations influence 
the three independent  variables:  the propensity to the consumption, the 
marginal efficiency of the capital and the preference for the liquidity.  In 
consequence, we can say that Kregel not only intends to interpret Keynes, 
but also to trace a modellization way where the methodology of Keynes 
acquires full meaning.  Keynes was determinated to analyse a monetary 
economy, where certainty does not exist nor perfect forecast, where the 
future is not known, nor there is a mathematical probability that may allows 
the forecasting of the existence of markets with future prices. 
The interpretation of Minsky [1985, 24-55] must be understood as the 
formulation of a theory where he captures the aspects neglected in the 
theory of Keynes, namely those where the unstable character of the 
investment is emphasizes, less on account of the tendency of the marginal 
efficiency of the capital to fall than because the marginal efficiency of capital 
is susceptive of revisions provoked by recurrent evaluations caused by the 
speculative activity which provokes the rise of the interest rate, making 
determined projects of investment less income-producing.  In this 
interpretative line, the cyclical character of the investment is the main cause 
of the cyclical fall of the income and, therefore, of the employment. In a 
certain way  Minsky, is right when he worries about the cyclical problems, 
and the relevance is important, given the situation of almost negation of the 
economic cycles that characterized the economic theory in the sixties.   
Keynes had not attributed a very great prominence to the economic cycle. 
In the Treatise on Money, Keynes attributes the cycle to the movements of 
the interest rate of around the wicksellian natural rate, explaining the 
disequilibria as the variability of the saving and the investment, or the 
remunerations of the factors related to output.  In the General Theory, the 
cycle is due to the fluctuations of the marginal efficiency of the capital, and 
therefore, to the elements of regularity of the cycle, the psychological 
aspects of the crisis can be added, characterized for the preference for the 
liquidity in situation of uncertainty, which make the unemployment 
persistent.   12
The unemployment can follow the cycle, if the investment level is kept low, 
if the propensity to the consumption generated by the persistence of the 
unemployment is kept low.  The specific theoretical explanation of Keynes 
is relative to the depression as a phase of the cycle.  In this sense, the long 
period of full employment is a fact explained through the existence of solid 
financial structures instituted from the great depression.  It is interesting to 
observe Minsk´s vision in the sense that the period after the second world 
war was characterized by a stability of the financial structures, which 
culminates with credit  crunch of 1966, and hence the recent financial 
instability allows to think the financial crises as systemic and not as a 
possibility. 
The rupture of Keynes with the vision connected with the cycle to the 
fluctuations of the level of the interest rate results from the admission of the 
instability of the investment and from the volatileness of the marginal 
efficiency of the capital, which determine the demand for the investment 
capital.  The investment is in Keynes a function of the price of supplys of the 
capital, the interest and the long run expectations.  These are the three 
arguments that explain the variability of the investment.  Minsky refers 
exclusively to the relation between price of supply of capital and the interest 
level. 
To Keynes, the causes that make vary the marginal efficiency of the capital, 
caeteris paribus, are the collapse of the prices in the stock market and the 
long term expectations, i.e. the waves of confidence that are cheated by the 
opinions of the speculators on the future of the interest rate and the price of 
the title and the confidence of the entrepreneurs on the future incomes 
produced by the use of a determined capital good.  These influence the 
demand of investment goods and the supply of capital.  In spite of that, a 
collapse of the prices in the stock market can cause a change in the 
expectations.  If this changes affect the expectations on future incomes a 
crisis can take place, which does not starts from the effects of the variations 
of the interest rate.  This is the crucial point of Keynes´s explanation.   
Minsky emphasizes a central aspect of the theory of Keynes that consist of 
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